Why Putin is not interested in meaningful talks with Ukraine

Western media continue to report that Russian President Vladimir Putin is interested in a negotiated ceasefire in Ukraine, although Kremlin rhetoric and Russian military actions suggest that Putin is disinterested in meaningful negotiations and any settlement that would prevent him from pursuing the destruction of an independent Ukrainian state. . Reuters reported on May 24 that four Russian sources who currently work or have worked with Putin said that Putin is ready to negotiate a ceasefire that recognizes the current frontlines and that Putin is ready to present the current amount of occupied Ukrainian territory as a Russian military victory. to the Russian public. Western media reported similar interest from Putin in December and January 2023 and February 2024 in a negotiated ceasefire or settlement based on statements from unspecified Russian sources with some level of alleged connections to Putin or the Kremlin. Western media cited limited unspecified US and international officials confirmed that Putin had expressed interest in a ceasefire, although other Western media reported that US sources denied that Russia had any official contact with the US on the matter.

The Kremlin regularly expresses interest in meaningful talks as part of a long-running information operation aimed at persuading the West to make concessions on Ukraine's territorial integrity and sovereignty, and it is unclear whether unspecified Russian sources who spoke to Western media are advancing these efforts or accurately portraying Putin's interests and views. to do ISW cannot determine the veracity of Russian sources' claims about Putin's intentions, and these private anonymous statements contrast sharply with Russian official public speech and actions. Putin and the Kremlin have significantly intensified their expansionist rhetoric on Ukraine since December 2023 and have increasingly signaled that Russia wants to conquer more territory in Ukraine and is committed to completely destroying Ukrainian statehood and identity. Russian forces have conducted offensive operations in recent months aimed at effectively making significant advances and breaking the frontline, opening a new front in Kharkiv Oblast (which Russia did not claim through illegal annexation), and attempting to inflict long-term damage. Regular large-scale missile and drone strikes undermine Ukrainian combat capabilities and economic potential. These military operations indicate that the Kremlin is more interested in achieving the long-term goal of maximum victory in Ukraine than any settlement that would immediately freeze the frontline where it currently stands.

Russian sources who have spoken to Western media have also offered contradictory characterizations of Putin's position on the talks. Reuters reported that a Russian source said that Putin wants to take as much territory as possible to force Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky to negotiate, but another Russian source assessed that Putin is not willing to negotiate with Zelensky. Russian sources also reported this information Reuters Putin believes the West will not arm Ukraine enough but realizes that any “dramatic” Russian progress requires another Russian nationwide mobilization. Delays in Western security assistance have severely limited Ukraine's defensive capabilities in recent months, and if Putin believes there are limits to Western support for Ukraine, he would reasonably conclude that such limits could re-emerge in the medium term and allow Russian forces to continue their current . The ability to make “dramatic” gains without managing the greater integration of manpower or the Russian economy. A Russian source said Putin is concerned that a protracted war will lead to more disgruntled veterans creating poor job prospects and economic conditions that could fuel domestic tensions, though this assessment is at odds with Russia's ongoing chronic labor shortage and the Kremlin's efforts to prepare Russian society. for a long war effort. These contradictions cast further doubt on the accuracy of these Russian sources as reflecting Putin's true thinking.

These Russian sources notably highlighted territorial concessions as part of Putin's purportedly planned ceasefire but rarely addressed the broader strategic objectives of Putin's war in Ukraine. Reuters reported that its Russian sources said Putin sees Russia's maintaining control over currently occupied Ukrainian territory as a non-negotiable basis for talks, and previous Western reports about Putin's openness to talks have similarly highlighted Russian territorial ambitions. Bloomberg It was reported in January that two unspecified sources close to the Kremlin said that Putin had indicated to senior US officials that he might be willing to drop Ukraine's demand for “neutral status” and even eventually abandon his opposition to Ukraine joining NATO. Russia's demands for Ukraine's “neutrality” and a moratorium on NATO expansion have always been, and continue to be, one of Putin's central arguments for his invasion of Ukraine, and any hypothetical concession to these demands would represent a major strategic and rhetorical retreat for Putin. Highly unlikely to be considered at this time. Putin launched his invasion of Ukraine to replace the Ukrainian government that he rightly defined and “demilitarize” the Ukrainian military so that Russia could unilaterally impose its will on Ukraine in the future without facing significant Ukrainian resistance. Russian sources who spoke to Western media about the ceasefire did not mention those two goals, which Kremlin officials regularly repeat. The repeated focus on recognizing occupied Ukrainian territory as Russian territory does not indicate that Russia will abandon these broader strategic objectives. A ceasefire that leaves currently occupied territory would reinforce the idea that Ukrainian territorial integrity is negotiable, a precedent that the Kremlin must reconsider to push for more territorial concessions and contest the idea of ​​Ukrainian statehood altogether.

A ceasefire does not prevent Russia from resuming its offensive to destroy Ukrainian statehood, and Russia will use any ceasefire to prepare for future offensives into Ukraine. Russia's military intervention in Crimea and Donbas in 2014 violated many of Russia's international commitments to respect Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity, including Russia's 1991 recognition of Ukraine as an independent state and the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, which does not specifically commit Russia to Ukraine. Territorial integrity. There is no reason to assess that the Kremlin will honor any new agreement obliging Russia not to violate Ukraine's sovereignty or territorial integrity. A cease-fire would allow the ongoing war in Ukraine to reallocate deteriorating forces, divert manpower to large-scale expansion and reform efforts, and allow Russia to further mobilize its defense industrial base (DIB) without the constraints of immediate operational requirements. In Ukraine. Russia could use a ceasefire to prepare forces better suited to launch the next series of offensives for regime change, disarmament and conquest of Ukraine. A ceasefire would give Ukraine its own opportunity to address energy production and defense industrial capabilities, but the Kremlin cannot unreasonably expect that a frozen frontline would make support for Ukraine less urgent and important to the West and allow Russia to outflank it. Ukraine is preparing to resume hostilities.

Russia is currently preparing for the possibility of a conventional war with NATO, and the Kremlin would likely see anything less than a capitulation of Ukraine as an existential threat to Russia's ability to do such a war. Russian military leaders planning a war against NATO must assume that Ukraine could enter such a war on NATO's side, regardless of Ukraine's membership status. A front with NATO along Russia's entire western border with Europe presents the Russian military with a serious challenge, as ISW has previously assessed, where a defeat in Ukraine would give Russia the ability to deploy its forces along the entire eastern edge of Europe, from the Black Sea to Finland. A Russian victory in Ukraine would not only eliminate the threat of Ukraine as a potential adversary during a potential conventional war with NATO but would also commit Russia to more resources and people in a large-scale conflict with NATO. How a Russian victory would split Ukraine into a Russian annexation and Kremlin-controlled puppet state that would follow Putin's desired regime change, Russia would have access to millions more people it could serve in the military and much of Ukraine's wealth and industrial capacity. So Putin and the Kremlin likely see victory in Ukraine as a prerequisite for being able to fight NATO and as a temporary pause in their efforts to destroy an independent Ukrainian state, a prerequisite for any ceasefire or negotiated settlement short of full Ukrainian surrender.

The Kremlin will continue to express interest in negotiations at key moments of the war to influence Western decision-making on support for Ukraine and to continue efforts to extract pre-determined concessions from the West. The Kremlin has repeatedly engaged in a large-scale reflexive control campaign aimed at influencing Western decision-making. Reflexive control is a key component of Russia's hybrid warfare toolkit and relies on shaping an adversary through targeted rhetoric and information operations in such a way that the adversary voluntarily takes actions that are advantageous to Russia. Kremlin officials claimed Russia was open to talks in December 2022, possibly delaying the delivery of Western tanks and other equipment to allow the Ukrainian mechanized counteroffensive to continue. Western reporting of Putin's alleged interest in the 2023-2024 winter talks coincides with a long debate in the US over security assistance to Ukraine, and the Kremlin may express interest in a ceasefire at this time to convince Western policymakers to press Ukraine for talks. Agree to a weak position and very likely a settlement that would heavily favor Russia. The Kremlin could reassert its interest in talks to influence the ongoing Western debate over lifting restrictions on Ukraine's use of Western-supplied weapons to attack military targets in Russia, and to convince Western policymakers that changing the restrictions could cause Russia to be disinterested in negotiations. In the future the Kremlin may again express interest in negotiations to pre-empt future Western negotiations on the provision of additional aid should Ukrainian forces contest the initiative and launch their own counter-offensive in the medium term. ISW continues to assess that continued provision of key Western systems will play a critical role in Ukraine's ability to compete in theater-wide initiatives and conduct future counteroffensive operations. U.S. officials recently said the resumption of U.S. security assistance would help Ukrainian forces fend off Russian attacks through the remainder of 2024, and that Ukrainian forces would launch counteroffensive operations to retake territory in 2025.