The Deposed Assad Associates Scheming to Regain Control in Syria
They were among the highest-ranking spymasters and military leaders in Bashar al-Assad’s regime, individuals who dedicated more than a decade to violently quashing a popular uprising in Syria. Now, a year after their exodus as the Assad regime crumbled, they are conspiring to disrupt the nascent government that displaced them, with the possibility of reclaiming a portion of the nation. It remains uncertain whether these former officials are a genuine threat to the new Syrian authorities, and they often conflict with one another. However, in conversations with participants and communication shared with The New York Times, it is evident that they are resolute in their intent to regain influence in Syria, which is still unsettled after 13 years of civil unrest. Some of these past regime leaders are trying to establish an armed rebellion from exile. One has backed a group behind a lobbying effort worth a million dollars in Washington. Several express a desire to seize Syria’s coastline, where the minority Alawite sect resides, which is the same sect that Mr. al-Assad and many of his senior military and intelligence officials belong to. “We won’t proceed until we are completely armed,” a former high-ranking commander of Syria’s infamous Fourth Division, Ghiath Dalla, 54, stated in an April telephone conversation from Lebanon that was intercepted unbeknownst to him. The conversation was one of many transcribed calls, text messages, and group chats provided to The Times by a collective of Syrian activists who claim to have infiltrated the phones of top Assad commanders prior to the regime’s disintegration and have continued monitoring them since. The Times analyzed the material and verified details with Syrian officials keeping tabs on the former regime figures, as well as with individuals in communication or collaborating with those who were hacked. The activists shared only a portion of their findings and spoke on the condition of anonymity to ensure their continued surveillance capabilities. Two prominent individuals engaged in these schemes are Suhail Hassan, previously Mr. al-Assad’s special forces commander, and Kamal Hassan, the former military intelligence chief of the dictator. Both individuals are under international sanctions due to accusations of war crimes. Text messages and interviews reveal that they have dispersed funds, enlisted fighters, and, particularly in Suhail Hassan’s network, acquired weaponry. The two generals sought asylum in Moscow alongside Mr. al-Assad in December 2024, yet both seem to have the ability to travel despite the international sanctions. Suhail Hassan has met with associates in Lebanon, Iraq, and even Syria within the past year, as indicated by text messages discussing his whereabouts. There were also communications mentioning Kamal Hassan traveling to Lebanon. An aide, a recruit, and an acquaintance confirmed to The Times their encounters with the former general there. Like others consulted regarding the former generals’ aspirations, they spoke on the condition of anonymity to reveal strategies intended to remain undisclosed. The Times was unable to contact Suhail Hassan. In response to inquiries via text, Kamal Hassan refuted any involvement in inciting an armed rebellion. Syrian officials observing the potential insurgents downplayed the danger of any uprising in Syria. The officials insisted on anonymity as they were not authorized to speak to the media. The nation remains sharply divided following a civil war that claimed over 600,000 lives. Parts of it exist only loosely under the control of the new government. Moreover, many individuals express concern over the extremist associations of Syria’s new leader, Ahmed al-Sharaa, who previously allied with Al Qaeda before heading the rebel offensive that removed Mr. al-Assad from power. Two former Assad officials collaborating with the ex-generals conveyed to The Times that they were well-positioned to recruit from a fearful Alawite community filled with ex-soldiers. Nonetheless, it remains unclear how many would respond. Numerous Alawites harbor deep resentment towards the regime following years of brutal civil conflict. ‘Holy Warrior’ The earliest communications intercepted and reviewed by The Times trace back to April 2025, when the activists who hacked the phones reported an uptick in activity among certain targets. A month earlier, more than 1,600 individuals, primarily Alawites, had perished in an eruption of sectarian violence involving thousands of armed men who surged to Syria’s Mediterranean coast after former Assad regime security forces executed a coordinated assault on the new government troops, resulting in the deaths of 16. This massacre served as a rallying point for former Assad officials aiming to enlist Alawite fighters. Initially, competing schemes to achieve this were noted by Erem News, an Abu Dhabi-based publication, and Reuters. Among those most engaged was Suhail Hassan, the ex-special forces commander, whose followers dubbed him “the Tiger” for his perceived ruthlessness in combat. He gained infamy among the Syrian opposition for his scorched-earth tactics and faces allegations of directing airstrikes on civilian targets. Long a favorite of the Russians, Mr. Hassan was among the first officials Moscow sought to evacuate as the regime was collapsing, according to four former officers. However, it seems he had little desire to remain inactive in Russia. From April to summer, the communications reviewed by The Times between Mr. Hassan and others indicate he was strategizing a comeback. Among these were handwritten diagrams sent from his phone in April that detailed the count of fighters and arms in various villages along Syria’s coast. Mr. Hassan dispatched these diagrams to an individual he referred to as the “commander in chief of our military and armed forces,” noting he had “verified” the identities of over 168,000 fighters: 20,000 equipped with machine guns, 331 with anti-aircraft weaponry, 150 with anti-tank grenades, and 35 snipers still retaining their arms. He concluded each message with the same sign-off: “Your servant, with the rank of holy warrior.” Mr. Hassan never identified his commander in the communications reviewed by The Times. However, three individuals involved in the initiatives asserted he collaborates with Rami Makhlouf, a Syrian billionaire and estranged cousin of Mr. al-Assad who also fled to Moscow. They claimed Mr. Makhlouf has financed Mr. Hassan’s aspirations and sent significant amounts to underprivileged Alawite families along the Syrian coast. Mr. Makhlouf presents himself as a quasireligious leader prepared to guide Syria’s Alawites, and according to those close to him, he believes he possesses the ability to foresee events using a mystical text he claims to own. His family declined to facilitate an interview with him. By spring, the intercepted communications revealed Mr. Hassan had enlisted Ghiath Dalla, the Fourth Division general. In one exchange, Mr. Dalla communicated with Mr. Hassan that he had allocated $300,000 in monthly payments to potential fighters and leaders, at rates of $200 to $1,000 per month. He sought permission to acquire satellite communication technology for roughly $136,600. An image shared on Facebook in 2020 rejoiced Ghiath Dalla’s elevation to command in Syria’s elite Fourth Division. The European Union imposed sanctions on Mr. Dalla in June due to his involvement in the coastal sectarian violence of Syria. Credit…Sayyid Baha al-Hayali al-Hasani, via Facebook In the messages, Mr. Dalla conveyed that he resided just across the border in a dwelling in Lebanon and that he and his family lacked electricity and painted walls. In some dialogues, he recounted a meeting with Iraqi militia leaders connected to Iran, where they deliberated on strategies for smuggling arms to insurgents without triggering Israeli strikes or being apprehended by Syrian authorities. He also recounted encounters with potential financiers. Other communications revealed Mr. Dalla canceling assassination plots and planning to gather or distribute drones and anti-tank missiles, including ones he claimed were concealed in Syria. In April, the two generals integrated another former general into their network, Muhammad al-Hasouri, 60, a previous air force commander accused of directly conducting a chemical weapons strike on the northern town of Khan Sheikhoun in 2017. Mr. Hassan asserted that Iranian officials had relocated Mr. al-Hasouri and 20 fellow regime pilots into a hotel in Lebanon. He said they had shown a willingness to remain and join his insurgency if he covered their accommodation and sustenance. A former regime official who stated he was in contact with Mr. al-Hasouri confirmed this in October, but later mentioned that the plans had disintegrated by the following month. He added that the broader network Mr. Dalla and Mr. Hassan had attempted to establish had begun to unravel. An Approach to Washington Kamal Hassan, the ex-military intelligence chief, is also characterized by associates in the intercepted communications as making payments to supporters and potential enlistees. Mr. Hassan is currently facing U.S. sanctions for supervising two infamous military intelligence branches, where leaked photographs from 2014 exhibited systematic torture and execution. When questioned about these allegations, Mr. Hassan stated, “I view these as politically motivated claims, which lack supportive documentation.” He also asserted that the allegations concerning his financing of insurgents contained “numerous inaccuracies and dubious facts.” Kamal Hassan, former military spy chief, appeared at a news conference in 2016. Mr. Hassan had previously overseen an intelligence branch accountable for the torture and deaths of thousands of detainees. Credit…Syrian Arab News Agency Two individuals collaborating with Mr. Hassan indicated he was more concentrated on establishing a network of influence than on fostering an insurgency. For instance, they mentioned that Mr. Hassan is a principal force behind the Beirut-based Foundation for the Development of Western Syria. The foundation presents itself as an organization advocating for Syrian minorities and supplying housing for Alawites who have fled to Lebanon. Nevertheless, those working with Mr. Hassan claim he utilizes it to lobby Washington for “international protection” for the Alawite region in Syria. Several online videos featuring Syrian refugees in Lebanon express gratitude to Mr. Hassan for his financial assistance, mirrored in a post on the foundation’s Facebook page. “All campaign expenses,” it notes, referencing a significant initiative for housing Alawite refugees, “were entirely covered by the Syrian citizen Major General Kamal Hassan.” As per U.S. disclosure filings from August, the foundation retained the American lobbying firm Tiger Hill Partners, along with Joseph E. Schmitz, a former Trump adviser and executive with Blackwater Worldwide, a private military contractor, on a $1 million agreement for representation. Mr. Hassan initially directed an interview request to Mr. Schmitz, referring to him as his attorney. However, later, Mr. Hassan refuted any connections to the foundation or “any Syrian organization,” adding, “but in principle, I support and encourage any measures that promote development and peace in Syria.” Mr. Schmitz chose not to comment on behalf of Mr. Hassan but declared on behalf of the foundation that they were striving to guarantee the protection and representation of minority communities in Syria. On various social media platforms, the foundation has highlighted meetings with six American legislators, including Representative Brian Mast, the Republican chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, and Senator Jeanne Shaheen, a Democratic member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Aides to Ms. Shaheen, Mr. Mast, and other legislators confirmed meeting Tiger Hill lobbyists, asserting that these were regular occurrences, mainly involving staff members. Numerous diplomats in Syria expressed greater concern regarding the lobbying efforts in Washington than the insurgency schemes. They argued that such initiatives could gradually lay the groundwork for calls advocating for a semi-autonomous region in Syria. “Currently, this proposal would not be feasible,” commented Bassam Barabandi, a former Syrian diplomat who fled the regime and has lobbied on behalf of its victims since 2012. “Nevertheless, two or three years from now, if the current government fails to ensure stability, U.S. leaders might seek other associates to collaborate with.” Neil Collier, Danny Makki, and Devon Lum contributed reporting. Muhsen AlMustafa contributed research. Aaron Byrd contributed graphics production.
Published: 2025-12-24 10:02:00
source: www.nytimes.com
