
A Dancing Dictator and Bankers in Chains: The Other Venezuela Blockade
A siege aimed at devastating Venezuela’s economy. A flamboyant Venezuelan leader noted for his eccentric dance styles during times of crisis. A U.S. administration striving to assert military dominance in Latin America. Indeed, these descriptions encapsulate the turmoil currently affecting Venezuela. However, they also relate to a military campaign against Venezuela from the early 20th century, which caused a transformative shift in U.S. interactions with Latin America. The Venezuela crisis of 1902-03 brought global attention to Cipriano Castro, a dictator known for his extravagant lifestyle who was referred to as the “Lion of the Andes.” His governance in Venezuela was characterized by a continual state of hostility toward the era’s great powers. When their patience ran thin over Venezuela’s unpaid debts, Germany, Britain, and Italy turned to what was considered gunboat diplomacy at that time, leveraging their naval strength to compel Venezuela to meet its financial commitments. “It’s the closest analogue in many ways to what is happening today,” noted Francisco Rodríguez, a Venezuelan economist based at the University of Denver. The parallels between the two blockades highlight how elements of the existing standoff, such as Nicolás Maduro’s anti-imperialist rhetoric and President Trump’s ambition to assert U.S. leadership in the Western Hemisphere, evoke earlier historical contexts. In the first Venezuela crisis, the blockade triggered an outpouring of anti-German sentiment in the American press, primarily fueled by apprehensions regarding Germany’s rapid naval expansion and the aspirations of Wilhelm II, the volatile kaiser ruling over Germany. Initially somewhat indifferent to European attempts to collect debts, President Theodore Roosevelt took this public sentiment into account. The United States, recently having taken possession of Puerto Rico and the Philippines as spoils from the Spanish-American War, was on the rise. “The United States had a sense that events were running in its favor, much like the Chinese see themselves today,” expressed Jack Thompson, a lecturer in American studies at the University of Amsterdam. Roosevelt directed the largest assembly of American naval power ever seen in the Caribbean up to that moment, signaling that the U.S. was willing to engage in combat to thwart Germany’s expansion in the area. Subsequently, Germany, along with Britain and Italy, consented to settle the dispute with Venezuela through arbitration, effectively conceding to U.S. military dominance. The following year, the American president revitalized the Monroe Doctrine, which had warned European powers against further colonization in the Americas, by appending his own “Roosevelt Corollary” to this foundational foreign policy. This asserted that the United States had the authority to exercise “police power” in the Americas when it identified cases of misconduct, paving the way for decades of military interventions, coups, and outright invasions in Latin American nations. In November, President Trump introduced his own “Trump Corollary.” This claims that his administration should take action in the Americas to prevent mass migration to the U.S. and guarantee a hemisphere “free of hostile foreign incursion or ownership of key assets.” Just as Roosevelt’s military buildup served as a warning to Germany, a rising power during that time, Mr. Trump’s blockade of sanctioned oil vessels in Venezuela specifically targets China, which absorbs 80 percent of Venezuela’s oil exports and has made substantial economic penetrations throughout Latin America. Nonetheless, significant differences exist between the two blockades; they are, after all, 122 years apart. One centers on Venezuela’s economy. Civil wars and uprisings had devastated Venezuela, but at the start of the 20th century, the nation was relatively isolated from global trade and did not rely on imports to sustain its population. Currently, Venezuela depends almost entirely on oil, which constitutes over 90 percent of its export revenues. While analysts assert that certain oil revenues are siphoned off due to corruption, Mr. Maduro’s administration requires the income from this trade to maintain the military’s capabilities and to import essential goods like food. Another stark distinction pertains to the United States, which has transitioned from a moderate power to a nuclear-armed titan. After decades during which the U.S. focused on objectives in the Middle East and Asia, Mr. Trump is redirecting attention toward the Western Hemisphere. His intimidation tactics against Venezuela merely mark the beginning of this reorientation, as the Trump administration has indicated, part of a broader initiative to reclaim U.S. preeminence in a region where leaders have long championed principles of national sovereignty and nonintervention. Still, other similarities between the two Venezuelan blockades suggest that while history may not be repeating, it does exhibit some echoing features. Consider Cipriano Castro, the Venezuelan leader at the center of the 1903 crisis. Much like Mr. Maduro today, he portrayed his presidency as both a defense against a new wave of colonialism and a rejection of affluent Venezuelan elites who aligned with foreign interests. Standing at just 5 feet 5 inches tall, he frequently donned high-heeled boots and an elaborate plumed hat to appear taller, as well as oversized military uniforms adorned with medals and large gold epaulets. “He possesses the vanity of a peacock, the fury of a tiger, and the traits of a satyr,” a British diplomat once remarked about Castro. When bankers declined to renegotiate Venezuela’s debt following Castro’s assumption of power in 1899, he had them shackled and paraded through Caracas. The next day, they agreed to fund his government. “It’s somewhat tongue in cheek, but I consider that the most successful debt restructuring in Venezuelan history,” remarked Mr. Rodríguez, the economist. Mr. Maduro has taken to song and dance during the current standoff with Washington, while Castro was known during the 1903 blockade for hosting balls that lasted from sunset until the following morning, according to historical accounts. At one juncture, while British and German warships were capturing Venezuelan naval vessels, he hosted a ball at Miraflores Palace, then the official presidential residence in Caracas, sipping champagne and dancing for hours with a rotating selection of mistresses as generals waited anxiously in the halls with urgent messages. The historical narrative does not consistently cast Roosevelt in a favorable light during the Venezuela crisis. He harbored deep disdain for Castro, referring to him as an “unspeakably villainous little monkey,” reflecting the racism that colored both his own beliefs and American politics during that era. Could the resolution of the initial Venezuela blockade provide any insights into how the current standoff might potentially conclude? It may be premature to determine. Castro clung to power for a few years until his deteriorating health (allegedly due to “debauchery,” according to U.S. diplomats) compelled him to seek treatment in Europe in 1908. His chief aide, Juan Vicente Gómez, then took control in a bloodless coup supported by the United States. Castro remained in exile until his passing in 1924. Gómez governed Venezuela with an iron grip, amassing a vast fortune while employing spies and agents to dominate the country through coercion and intimidation. He granted concessions to U.S. oil entities, maintained favorable relations with global powers, and eliminated Venezuela’s foreign debt. Gómez ruled until 1935, when he died peacefully in his bed at the age of 78.
Published: 2025-12-27 10:01:00
source: www.nytimes.com
